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"I propose to beg no question, to shrink from no conclusion, but to follow truth wherever it may lead. Upon us is the responsibility of seeking the law, for in the very heart of our civilization today women faint and little children moan. But what that law may prove to be is not our affair. If the conclusions that we reach run counter to our prejudices, let us not flinch; if they challenge institutions that have long been deemed wise and natural, let us not turn back."Henry George, Progress and Poverty, (1881).
In his provocative book Beyond Newton my friend Dewey Larson argued that Albert Einstein was correct when he said that Isaac Newton's ideas about gravitation were inadequate. But, continued Larson, Einstein's proposals for improving on Newton's ideas were themselves profoundly incorrect and moved our attempts to explain gravity in the wrong direction. To put things back on the right track, said Larson, we needed to back up to Newton and then move forward in a different direction than that favored by Einstein. Hence, he chose to name his book Beyond Newton rather than Beyond Einstein.
In the following pages I am going to make exactly the same argument with regard to Karl Marx's program for replacing capitalism. Although agreeing with Marx that capitalism is far from an ideal state of affairs, I will demonstrate that to make an ideal society we will need to move beyond capitalism in a very different direction from what Marx prescribed. It also turns out that we must use reformist methods to implement the necessary changes, not the revolutionary methods favored by the Communists.
The capitalist countries of North America and Western Europe are clearly not ideal societies. The litany of imperfections is long and depressing. We see high levels of unemployment even in good times. We see great insecurity even among people who are employed. Recessions, technological change, and unfriendly corporate takeovers constantly threaten to destroy the organizations which employ us. We see poverty that persists in spite of crusades and even "wars" against it. We see incredible economic inequality, billionaires and paupers.
We see violent crimes depriving millions of people of personal security and freedom to move about in pursuit of their legitimate business. We see prisons with no room for hardened criminals, prisons whose graduates return to society even less prepared for decent lives than they were when they were sentenced.
We see local environmental blight and large scale trends which might conceivably wreck the ecology of the planet as a whole, including the climate. We see continuous inflation and skyrocketing increases in debt both in our private lives and in the public arena.
We see neglected and abused children, disintegration of families, rampant sexual promiscuity, epidemics of STD's. We see societies where--reversing Marx's description of religion as "the opiate of the masses"--opiates have become the religion of the masses. In an age of supposed tolerance and of widespread antidiscrimination legislation, we see apparent increases in racially based hostility and hatred. We see, to make a long story short, that the socio-economic systems of the developed and industrialized democracies are not perfect. They don't even come close!
By no means am I contending that these problems exist only in capitalist countries. The situation in most of the dimensions I have listed is far worse in the "less developed countries" of the third world. Likewise, crime, environmental devastation, and inequality permeated the Communist-run countries; it was only after Gorbachev introduced a free press in the U.S.S.R. that the extent of these problems became widely understood. It was no accident that the Communist and third world countries have had problems with citizens who want to leave illegally, whereas the capitalist countries have problems with people who come in illegally. But the fact remains that capitalism has not only failed to solve or reduce many of these problems, but that some of them are actually getting worse in the developed countries.
Some of the problems afflicting capitalist societies have been mitigated by private charity and governmental programs. In the United States, for example, unemployment compensation provides some protection against the economic consequences of losing employment. Welfare programs help to support women and children whose husbands and fathers have abandoned them. Medicaid supplies medical care to some people who cannot afford to pay for it.
But welfare programs can have a down side. They can encourage the breakup of even more families. They can make it more profitable for some people to refuse employment than to work, thus depriving them of the dignity, discipline, education, and other "non-economic" benefits of working. Properly structured welfare programs will probably exist even in an ideal society. But many existing programs are probably substitutes for, not examples of, adequate social institutions.
Capitalism's problems have been addressed by three major schools of thought. One school, urging that modern socio- economic systems are not really capitalist, suggests that we need to restore "true", laissez-faire, capitalism. "Deregulate" everything, get the government "off our backs," limit government to enforcing contracts, policing the streets, and defending from foreign attack, and let the market take care of everything else. Although this prescription is not widely supported, it deserves serious consideration. I will try to explain why it is grossly inadequate, and likely to become more so in the future, in chapter 7, "How Much Government Do We Need?" However implementing my own recommendations will produce a society where arbitrary government regulation of the economy is eliminated and all prices are determined by market forces. While mine will not be the society envisioned by the "back to true capitalism" people, many of its features will give them some satisfaction.
A second school holds that capitalism's problems can be solved by doing more of the same kinds of thing that have already been tried, or by doing them better: more or better welfare, more or better social insurance, more or better regulation of economic transactions. In specific cases, these people may have a point. It is difficult to hit exactly the right note in initial efforts to fix a serious problem. However a great deal of time and talent have already been devoted to this approach. Results have been modest, and to some extent even disastrous. And the net effect of the various welfare, insurance, regulation, and legal measures taken under this traditional approach is to move society in the direction of the excess centralization found in the Soviet Union and its satellites before the Communist experiments self-destructed. This alone casts doubt on the usefulness of the traditional approach.
The third school of thought, by far the most influential during the twentieth century, was that of the Marxists. The Communists insisted that capitalism was hopelessly inadequate (though admittedly a step forward from the previously even more inadequate system of feudalism), and that it could not be fixed by the patchwork of reforms advocated by the second school of thought discussed above.
Although the Marxists correctly pointed to many weaknesses and deficiencies in capitalist societies, their analysis was profoundly incorrect and their prescriptions turned out to be largely socio-economic quackery.
Although capitalism was vulnerable to many criticisms, Marxist propagandists exaggerated its vices. They portrayed capitalism not just as bad, but as impossibly bad. For example, they claimed that capitalism produces unemployment and also exploits (substantially underpays) workers. Any socio-economic system that produces either of these results would be open to legitimate criticism, of course. But the Marxist charge that capitalism produces both unemployment and underpayment of workers ignores the fact that these two problems cannot exist at the same time. A society in which some people are unemployed and others are underpaid can, of course,exist. But it is impossible to have a society in which people in general are underpaid and there is also any substantial unemployment. (I will explain why this is so in chapter 5, "Voluntary Associations and Organizations.")
The more important problem with Marxism, however, was that it produced deplorable results when it was put into practice. The catastrophic political consequences cannot all be blamed on Joseph Stalin. Without a totalitarian political system, it would have been impossible to create an economic system reflecting the Marxist vision. When Mikhail Gorbachev introduced a free press and democratization, therefore, it soon became necessary to abandon the effort to "build socialism" in any historical sense of the term.
Even with all of the "advantages" of the totalitarian political system, the Soviet Union never achieved a viable Marxist economic system. The reasons for this failure are clear. The basic economic problem in Marxist theory is its hostility to markets. In markets, people and organizations are free to buy and sell at mutually acceptable prices; decisions about what and how much to produce are widely decentralized. Marxists noted the huge economic inequalities existing under capitalism and attributed them to the market economy. But the Soviet effort to suppress markets and to dictate politically the quantities and prices of all goods and services produced very bad results: shortages, bottlenecks, lack of coordination (in a "planned economy"!), technological stagnation, and gross waste of natural resources.
Well before Gorbachev came to power, a healthy, implicitly anti-Marxist trend was already visible in the Soviet Union. The new Constitution of 1977 seemed to stimulate officially tolerated calls for "socialist legality," It was only one more step to the officially endorsed goal, under Gorbachev, of adhering to the "rule of law." As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, the rule of law requires both a market economy (contradicting a basic Marxist economic goal) and political democracy (contradicting the necessary political means by which Marxists sought to achieve their economic goal.)
The unsuccessful experiments in the Soviet Union and other "Communist" countries have thoroughly discredited Marxism as an escape route from the problems of capitalism. We do need to go beyond capitalism. But we need to move beyond capitalism in a different direction from that proposed by the Marxists.
In spite of Marxism's colossal failure in practice, it still has one feature which is very appealing. The attractive element in Marxism is its vision of a classless society. If a class society is one in which there are unjust distinctions between various categories of people, few people would favor such a society as an abstract goal. Individuals belonging to one of the favored categories might support the status quo from which they are benefitting. But no one would favor a class society from behind a Rawlsean veil of ignorance or "original position," from a pre-birth sentient existence in which one knows the general contours of the society but could not find out into what class or specific circumstances he or she will be born.
Anti-Communists have assumed that the idea of a classless society was a monopoly of the Marxists. It is now high time to recognize that a classless society is an ideal with very wide appeal.
Marx himself rather backhandedly admitted as much in the Communist Manifest (1848). Attacking "the socialistic bourgeois," he sarcastically exclaimed that their idea of a classless society was one in which there would be "a bourgeoisie without a proletariat." For Marx, this idea was nonsensical by definition. But if we employ Marx's own logic such a society would be just as classless as the one he had in mind.
Marx's publications were devoted to explaining how a classless society would emerge from capitalism. According to Marx, the history of mankind was the history of class conflict. Each major stage of history was dominated by the class which owned the prevailing form of productive property. A prehistorical phase of "primitive communism" in which nothing is owned is followed by a stage of slavery in which people are the prevailing form of productive property. As a result of the struggle of the classes, society moves onward and upward to feudalism, in which the dominant form of productive property is land and landowners are the ruling class. Capitalism, in which factories are the prevailing form of productive property, in turn emerges from feudalism.
According to Marx, prior to capitalism there were often many classes, but under the conditions of capitalism they shake down to the irreducible (under capitalism!) number of two. One class is the bourgeoisie, the city-dwelling capitalists, the owners of the factories. The other remaining class is the proletariat, the "working class," whose members have no property and who can live only by selling their labor power to the capitalists on terms which are very disadvantageous to the workers. As capitalism matures, according to Marx, it drives the proletariat into deeper and deeper misery until, realizing where their interests lie with the aid of perspicacious analysts (like Karl Marx!) the proletariat unites and rises up to overthrow the dominant bourgeoisie. It is not clear whether Marx himself thought that the revolution had to be violent or that it could be achieved peacefully via the ballot box. But the dominant Marxist school in the twentieth century argued that violence was a (regrettable) necessity and that those who felt otherwise were "revisionists," i.e. heretics.
In either event, according to Marxism the "revolutionary" overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat does not immediately change the fact that the society is divided into two classes. The only difference is that after the revolution the proletariat is on the top (the "dictatorship of the proletariat") and the bourgeoisie is on the bottom. The society is now in a transitional stage, which Marx calls "socialism" to distinguish it from the ideal system "communism," towards which it is heading. Under socialism, there is still a state--which for Marx is merely a mechanism by which one class subjects and exploits the other class or classes in the society. But unlike the capitalist state, the socialist state promotes the interests of the proletariat. In contrast to capitalist exploitation the society now works on the principle, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." Workers are now to be paid the actual value of their labor, not ripped off as they allegedly are under capitalism. Footnote 1.
Communism, the ultimate Marxist vision, comes when the transitional stage of socialism has run its course. By now the bourgeoisie has been "liquidated," an ambiguous term that could mean the physical extermination of its members or merely the peaceful absorption of its members into the ranks of the proletariat. Whatever the details, when the bourgeoisie has been liquidated, all that remains is the proletariat. But classes cannot exist singly! In order for there to be a class, there has to be at least one other class. Hence once the bourgeoisie has disappeared you do not have a one-class society, you have instead a classless society.
This is not a trivial, "merely semantic" point. To a Marxist this is a qualitatively different society than the previous ones (whether capitalist or socialist). For one thing, since Marx defines the state as an instrument for the subjection of one class by another, by definition no such state can exist in the classless society. Thus, the state has "withered away." For another thing, the ruling principle now would be "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" (emphasis added).
Marx thus maintains there are only two classes left under capitalism and that if one of these classes is abolished what is left would be a classless society. The class that Marx chooses for the honor of disappearing happens to be the bourgeoisie. But there is no reason in principle why classlessness could not be achieved instead by eliminating the other class, the proletariat.
And that is why Marx's wisecrack in the Communist Manifesto is so interesting. By referring to his rivals' desire for a society in which there is "a bourgeoisie without a proletariat," Marx is admitting that there is another path by which we might move forward from capitalism to a (the?!) classless society: by absorbing the proletariat into the ranks of the bourgeoisie.Footnote 2. Only if it is impossible for some reason to eliminate the proletariat can this alternate route be rejected. Furthermore, this alternate route may provide us with a very different perspective on the nature of a classless society than Marx was able to furnish.
Given the utter failure of more than 70 years of Communist experiments, I submit that the "proletarian" route to the classless society has turned out to be impossible. The possibility of a "bourgeois" path to the same goal remains to be determined.
Somewhat after I had developed my vision of the Metaconstitution, it occurred to me that it would constitute a society which is classless. Indeed, it took some time for me to rise above my preconceptions and admit to myself that classlessness need not be a Marxist monopoly.
The classless society suggeted by the Metaconstitution would be a thoroughly bourgeois place. Far from repudiating bourgeois, capitalist values, it would implement them to the greatest degree imaginable. Individual liberty, political and economic, would be maximized, limited only by government conducted in accordance with the requirements of democracy and of the rule of law. Prices of all goods and services would be determined by the market rather than by central decree. Legitimate property rights would be fully respected.
The basic sense in which the Metaconstitutional society would be classless is that government would have no power to enact or enforce pseudolaws. In due course I will explain precisely how pseudolaws are to be distinguished from genuine laws. (Chapter 2) For now, let it simply be noted that the principal defect in pseudolaws is lack of generality. Pseudolaws do not apply the same standard to all actors. Some notable examples of pseudolaws would be:
To achieve the Metaconstitutional society we must eliminate all pseudolaws. This is easy enough to say, but getting rid of all pseudo-laws will require major changes in our institutions. Part I of this book, "What Ought To Be?," will demonstrate that eliminating pseudolaws will require five things. 1) All governments must be democratic (chapter 3); 2) Radical changes must be made in the rules regarding the ownership of land and all other natural resources (chapter 4); 3) Present strategies for regulating the employment relationship will have to be abandoned (chapter 5); (4) Many widespread attitudes regarding the place of work in human life will need to be reconsidered (chapter 8); (5) We must establish a universal government (chapter 6).
Given today's attitudes and arrangements, the most controversial change needed to rid ourselves of all pseudolaws is the establishment of a universal (world) government. Universal government is not just an additional ingredient casually thrown into the pot because I happen to think it would be a good idea. It is necessary if we are to enjoy a secure democracy. It is necessary if we are to have legitimate property. Its absence is incompatible with the goal of exterminating pseudolaws. I propose to demonstrate that the concept of an "illegal alien" is not only a philosophical abomination, it epitomizes pseudolaw.
An explanation of the word "Metaconstitution" is in order. "Meta" means "beyond." "Metaphysics," for example, is a standard philosophical term refering to areas of discourse such as ethics and aesthetics that go beyond the study of our physical universe. Likewise "metaconstitution," a term which I believe I personally invented, means "beyond a constitution."
Think about it this way: our actions can be evaluated on the basis of moral rules and legal rules. Legal rules in turn can be evaluated to see if they are consistent with a constitution. (We call this practice "judicial review".) But constitutions themselves can be created and destroyed, modified and amended. By what standards can we evaluate the adequacy of constitutions and proposed changes to constitutions? A set of principles by reference to which we can evaluate actual or proposed constitutions is a metaconstitution, a vision of the ideal constitution.
In a world filled with billions of people who see things from many different perspectives, there are bound to be conflicting opinions about what an ideal constitution would be like. Not all of these opinions rise to the dignity of a metaconstitution. Some may contain motley sets of desired elements, knocked together with little thought of their mutual compatibility in principle or in practice. Footnote 3. Others may propose to set up a society containing some elements that are inherently, not just immediately impossible.Footnote 4. Such visions might quite properly be called Utopias, not metaconstitutions.
A metaconstitution does not contemplate creating an impossible state of affairs. It must therefore give due heed to the limits imposed by our natural environment, by the rules of logic and mathematics, and by human nature. (Those proposing to change human nature and not just its particular manifestations are utopians, not metaconstitutionalists. As somebody once unkindly said of Richard Nixon, we ought to give them our "undivided suspicion.")
Unlike a Utopia, a metaconstitution does not promise conditions so overwhelmingly attractive that its proponents will rush out to implement it by all means fair or foul, "at any price." And a metaconstitution focuses on fundamental institutions and does not purport to provide a complete, detailed picture of the ideal society and of life.
Most, visions of an ideal society are probably utopias, not metaconstitutions. But there are still bound to be many metaconstitutions, not just one. As the apparent inventor of the word metaconstitution, I have therefore taken the liberty of appropriating the capitalized version of the word-- Metaconstitution--to designate my own vision of the ideal society which will be presented in the following chapters.
The Metaconstitution presented in Part I is my effort to answer one of the three fundamental questions of political philosophy: what ought to be? Footnote 5. Part II, on the other hand, discusses a second fundamental question: what ought to be done? How should we go about trying to get to a Metaconstitutional society? If we ever get to such a society, how should we act to maximize its longevity?
In theory, it might not even be a good idea to try to achieve a Metaconstitutional world. The reasons for this can be seen clearly if we think in terms of a simple analogy. Imagine that you have been in a shipwreck and find yourself cast up alone on an isolated island like Robinson Crusoe. It is possible to survive on your island, but it is far from an ideal place in terms of its ability to supply adequate food, shelter, and clothing. But not too far away across the water you can see another island, and it is clear that in several ways it would be a much better place to be.
So what ought to be? The answer is clear and unequivocal: you ought to be on the other island. But exactly what ought to be done does not follow simply and straightforwardly from your answer to the first question. The answer to this second question, what ought to be done, depends also on the details of the circumstances that you presently find yourself in. Circumstances are important because they may make some conceivable actions impossible, and they may determine whether the consequences of those actions which are possible will be satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
For example, suppose that you do not know how to swim, and that furthermore there are no materials available on your present island with which you could construct a boat or raft. (This, alas, is just another way in which the island is inferior!) If this were the case, it would make sense to say:
Or perhaps you do swim, but the water between the two islands is full of sharks. Again, this is something that you would do well to consider before deciding what to do, no matter how convinced you are that the other island would be a better place to be.
One of the dangers of utopias is that they promise a future that is so absolutely wonderful that people may ignore the dictates of prudence in trying to bring it into existence. The Metaconstitution--or indeed any vision of an ideal society that qualifies as a metaconstitution with a small m, as defined above--presents no such danger. It portrays a future society that is relatively wonderful, compared to today, but which still leaves people with plenty to be unhappy or worried about. A bad socio-economic system may make a decent life impossible for most people. A good system can make a decent life for most people possible but cannot guarantee they will actually achieve it. There is little danger that rabid Metaconstitutionalists will rush off unwisely to try to bring their blessings to mankind via war or revolution, the usual methods adopted by zealots who are in a hurry.
Part II will urge that reform rather than war or revolution is the only way to go. Even reform, however, is not without its problems as a method of bringing about progress.
The reformer, for example, does not work in ideal circumstances. (Ideal circumstances would be found only in an ideal society, i.e. one not needing the services of reformers!) The reformer must work within existing circumstances, no matter how bad they may be, and must be content to take advantage of the limited opportunities these circumstances offer to move things in the right direction. No matter how bad current circumstances are, the reformer must remember that it is always possible for an unwise action to make those circumstances worse!
Also, the reformer must be careful about the order in which the elements of a new and better society are introduced. Reform is inherently gradual. The elements of the ideal society cannot be put into place simultaneously. But it is possible that introducing one element of the ideal society into an otherwise un-ideal one may actually worsen the total state of affairs rather than moving things forward. In a town with two polluting factories, for example, one may be emitting acid pollutants and the other basic (in the chemical sense) pollutants. Since acids and bases neutralize each other, the net effect on the local environment may be minimal. But if some anti-pollution crusader manages to shut down one of the two skunk works in the name of progress, the damage done by the remaining factory may be immense.
Reformers, thus, must cope creatively with strong limits on what can be achieved in any given period of time. They must work to overcome inherently conservative public and elite opinion, while fending off criticism from revolutionaries who accuse them of selling out to the status quo. They must cope with the natural tendencies of a society to comply with the laws of inertia and drift.
Most difficult of all, perhaps, reformers must try to persuade people to invest in the future. Reforms can be seen abstractly as actions under present circumstances that try to improve the circumstances we will be working within in the future. Investment requires that we "consume" less in the present in order to be able to consume more in the future. There may be other, shorter run, goals that we could achieve with the same energies and resources that we instead must use if we are going to improve the future.
Fortunately, investment is very congenial to the bourgeois mentality, and as I have noted the Metaconstitution is an expression of bourgeois values pushed to their extreme limits. Unfortunately, before the proletariat has been liquidated by absorption into the ranks of the bourgeoisie by no means will everybody be supportive of investing in the future. In the non-ideal present there are many people who are "lower class" in the Banfieldean sense, who will not personally defer any gratification in the interest of a better long run, who cannot look beyond their noses.Footnote 6. Nor will all of these "lower class" people be poor and powerless. They will include many people in the elites who, living as well or better than they could expect to in any other conceivable society, have no interest in investing, but prefer to "eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die!"
Present trends in the more "advanced" societies toward family instability and the devaluation of children will aggravate the problems facing reformers. Concern for the future welfare of their children can be a powerful incentive to invest, both economically and politically. Parents who are not well off may work so their children will have it better. Parents who "have it made" may still wish to improve society so as to guarantee their descendants a decent future even if they are not similarly privileged. To the extent people do not have children or do not take those children they do have seriously, they have less reason to be concerned about the future of their society.
Reform implies a particular outlook towards the past, the present, and the future. Thinking about a desired future state of affairs requires us to study the present in order to understand the specific opportunities for action and the limits thereto that our present circumstances allow. The desire to act effectively rather than ineffectively in the present so as to bring about a better future requires us in turn to take a careful and sustained look at the past. By studying past efforts to bring about desired changes and the actual, often undesired results of those efforts, perhaps we can learn how to act wisely in the present. As Bismarck said once, fools learn by experience; wise people learn from other people's experience.
Reformers owe it to society to go about the job thoughtfully and intelligently. The nobility of our intentions is not enough. We must never forget what the road to hell is paved with.
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1. Marx's concept of socialism as a transitional stage on the path to communism should not be confused with the socialism which was the ultimate goal of the democratic socialist parties in western Europe. The vision of the democratic socialists was so different from that of the Marxists that it is no exaggeration to say they were two different visions sharing a common name. As Alfred Korzybski, S.I. Hayakawa, etc., repeatedly warned us, "the name is not the thing."
2. Because of the great size of the proletariat, compared to the bourgeoisie, it would be unthinkable to advocate "liquidating" it in the physical sense in which some Marxists seemd to intend for the bourgeoisie. Nor could there be any plausible motive for advocating any such physical extermination of the proletariat. It might be argued that the bourgeoisie had an interest in not being pulled down one by one into the proletariat and that their resistance to this would make extermination necessary. The proletariat, by contrast, has no interest in resisting being pulled up into the bourgeoisie. The moral and political logic of the two cases is thus entirely different.
3. As any economist can tell us, not all good things can be had at the same time because of the "opportunity costs" problem. Robert Nozick has done an especially thoughtful job of pointing out the political implications of this fact in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia (N.Y: Basic Books, 1984).
4. Impossibility exists in two different senses. The term can refer to actions that are never possible, or to those which are not presently possible. It is important to try to be clear about which form of impossibility we are talking about. There is no use in tilting at windmills or breaking our heads against a brick wall. On the other hand, "much historical experience. . . tells us that goals unattainable now will never be reached unless they are articulated while they are still unattainable." (Leszek Kolakowski, in Ann Fremantle, Communism: Basic Writings, New York: Mentor, 1970, p. 389.) Going to the moon was only presently impossible when the Kennedy Administration decided to do this in the early 1960s. By 1969, the impossibility had been turned into a realized possibility. Having one's cake and eating it too is impossible in the other sense, just as is increasing government spending while reducing taxes collected and preserving a stable currency all at the same time. When political leaders promise us the "impossible," we need to ask ourselves which kind of impossibility they are promising before we decide how to respond. The person wishing to convert present impossibilities into tomorrow's actualities may be a statesman who deserves our support. The person who promises to deliver the intrinsically impossible is a demagogue who should be hounded from public life as unceremoniously as possible.
5. These three questions of political philosophy are discussed in my previous book, Thinking About Politics: American Government in Associational Perspective (N.Y: D. Van Nostrand, 1981), and are, respectively, the subjects of the three final chapters of that work: "Beyond Utopia" (what ought to be?), "Beyond Revolution" (what ought to be done?), and "Beyond Politics" (what is the nature of man?).
6. See Edward Banfield, The Unheavenly City (Boston: Little, Brown), pp. 47-50.