Copyright © 1990 by Paul F. deLespinasse. Details of generous permission to make copies This chapter may not print or copy unless you have clicked here first.
Our basic relationship with government is an involuntary association, and in this sense we are justified in saying that government is an involuntary association. Actually, as we have seen, people are associated with the organization called government in many different ways. Some of our associations with government are voluntary, others are trusts, and still others are involuntary. But the involuntary associations are fundamental.
Through involuntary associations, government obtains most of the resources enabling it to induce people into voluntary associations with it. The policeman is hired by government-as-contractor I; as an employee, his relationship with the government is a compound-voluntary association. But government obtains the money used for his salary via the power of the sword. People who refuse to pay taxes are forcibly deprived of liberty or property, though not, in the current U.S., of life.
The idea that government is basically an involuntary association is neither new nor generally rejected. True, social contract theorists have argued that government is a voluntary association, is as if it were a voluntary association, or ought to be a voluntary association. Social contract theory has been influential in America ever since the "Mayflower Compact." However, contract theorists have always foundered on the fact that not everybody subject to a government consents, or has consented, to be governed by it. A contract, like any other voluntary association, requires mutual consent of all the parties, not just a majority of them. But when a government imposes sanctions it does not require unanimity. To hang someone in the U.S. requires unanimity of the jurors and judge but not the unanimity of all parties, which would include the defendant!
Various philosophies recognize that government is essentially an involuntary association. Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader, wrote that "All political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Anarchists, assuming that all involuntary associations are bad and seeing that governments are involuntary associations, conclude that there should be no government. St. Augustine, quoted above, bears repeating: "Justice being taken away, what are kingdoms but great robberies?"
The belief that all involuntary associations are bad is hard to refute. For most people the general undesirability of private- involuntary associations (robber-victim, air polluter-victim) and of compound-involuntary ones (the Nazi extermination campaign against Jews, military conscription, arbitrary economic regulations) is implicit in the examples we have adduced. One is tempted to tidy things up and conclude that public-involuntary associations are bad too. Before jumping to rash conclusions, however, let us think briefly about four functions or services provided by government:
Minimizing Private Sanctions. First, government protects us from private-involuntary associations. Through law, it attaches artificial side effects to private actions constituting such associations, thus making them less attractive options. Drunk driving carries the risk of accident, injury, property loss, and death. Government increases the risks by threatening fines, imprisonment, and license revocation. The existence of law presumes that people are less likely to commit murder if the side effect of such will be the electric chair.
Law can also be regarded as a price system calculated to run private-involuntary associations off the "market" by making them too "expensive."
Of course, laws are not entirely successful. Sanctions provided for violators may be inadequate to discourage the prohibited action--mere "slaps on the wrist." If the chance that a sanction will actually be imposed is low, people may discount its severity by its improbability. Indeed, increasing the required sanction for breaking a law may reduce the likelihood it will ever be imposed: electrocution deters no jaywalkers if juries refuse to convict flagrant violators because the find the punishment excessive.
No legal system can eliminate all crime. The only way to put a complete end to crime would be to repeal all laws, a "solution" which does not have much appeal. Thus government's function is not to eliminate private-involuntary associations but to minimize them. While repealing all laws would be counterproductive, "decriminalizing" some actions may be desirable if costs of outlawing them outweigh the benefits. As St. Thomas Aquinas noted many centuries ago, it is impossible for government to outlaw all sins. Government should not spread its limited enforcement capabilities too thin, neglecting to enforce more important laws while prosecuting less important ones. "Decriminalization" is most frequently discussed in the context of personal drug use, sexual activity, and so forth, which supposedly concern only the "consenting adults" involved.
Facilitating Private-Voluntary Associations. A second function of government is to facilitate private-voluntary associations. A contract is a legally enforceable agreement, and government encourages private-voluntary associations chiefly through laws regarding contracts. Of course, not all private agreements are enforceable. A coed agreeing to go out on a date with her boyfriend, for example, cannot be compelled to do so by a court if she tries to back out. Nor will any court order her to pay money damages to her friend even if, relying on her agreement, he obtains theater tickets or rents an automobile. But the fact that some agreements are legally enforceable increases our options, as Gordon Tullock explains:
It is clear that situations in which making such an enforceable promise is desirable are fairly frequent. I wish to buy a house and do not have enough money to do so. Borrowing the money will improve my satisfaction, but in order to borrow I have to convince the lender that I will repay. Perhaps I can get away with an unenforceable promise, but for most people such loans are only possible if there is some mechanism to enforce the repayment. Footnote 1.
Government not only makes enforceable agreements possible but it provides neutral judges to resolve disputes about such agreements. Some parties bypass the judge by jointly sending disputes to an arbitrator, but the courts are always available when less extreme measures fail. Without government, terms of voluntary associations would only be enforceable by the parties and their private associates, a messy and inefficient process at best. Government thus allows voluntary associations on a scale otherwise impossible. It is no exaggeration to say that private enterprise rests on public foundations.
Allocating Natural Resources. The third function served by government is allocating scarce natural resources. This function can only become more important as population increases while raw materials--at best-remain constant. Once something is someone's property, the usual rules of contract can be used to determine whether it has been duly transferred to somebody else. But endless problems arise regarding how something becomes the property of somebody to begin with. How do resources become the property of their first owner? The philosopher Pierre Joseph Proudhon answered this question with his famous aphorism: "Property is theft!" Somebody simply assumes ownership of the resources and it is his property as long as he can hang on to it. There are many terms for this process of creating ownership--"conquest," "squatting," "claiming," "staking out," and so forth. But might is not right, and property in resources (as in everything else) can only be determined by law, not by just grabbing it.
It is often assumed that natural resources that are not already owned automatically belong to the government. This assumption, however, is totally arbitrary and certainly cannot be done by government-as-legislator, which must express its basic decisions in the form of general rules. Although government-as-contractor,like any private person or association, can certainly own property, it has no more right to ownable but unowned resources than anybody else. Government-as-trustee I is trustee only for particular people or groups of people. Since determining which people shall own resources is the problem here, not the solution, government-as- trustee I is no help.
All existing or historical governments have determined ownership of natural resources (land, minerals, etc) arbitrarily. It is equally arbitrary to assume the government is the owner and then give the resources away or sell them (e.g. in the U.S., the Homestead Act) as it is to assume the government is the owner and always will be (e.g. in classical "Communist" countries). A solution to this dilemma, however, does exist, at least in theory. It is not arbitrary to assume that the public owns all previously unowned natural resources, since the public is by definition inclusive. Government-as-trustee II, acting for the public, could lease selected portions of these resources to the highest bidder, and the net receipts disbursed in equal amounts to all members of the public in the form of a social dividend. (Government-as-trustee II, for the public, is like the chemical elements whose possible existence was indicated by Mendelyeev's periodic table. It hasn't been seen yet, but it could turn up at any time.)
Protecting Citizens From Other Governments. A fourth governmental function is to protect us from other governments. One part of this function, defense against external attacks, may not always be necessary. If there were a world government, external defense would be unnecessary. But the fourth function would remain, for it includes defense against potential governments that might try to replace a current one.
It is quite possible for two or more governments to rule over the same area at the same time. In the United States at least three governments usually legislate for any one place: the federal government, a state government, and a city or county government. Often there are many more than three. During revolutions several governments generally exercise some control over the same area. In 1917 Russian was governed from February to October both by the Provisional Government under Alexander Kerensky and by; the Petrograd Soviet, dominated by Lenin. Both centers of authority issued orders that were obeyed to some extent. Likewise, large areas of South Vietnam were under both the Saigon regime and that of the Vietcong during much of the time the United States was involved in the war there. In many villages it was said that Saigon ruled by day, the Vietcong by night.
Subjection to more than one government is tolerable, however, only if there is a clear pecking order among them, as in the United States. When one government makes an action illegal and another in the same places makes avoiding that action illegal, their subjects are damned if they do and if they don't. They cannot protect themselves against sanctions for obeying the law, for obeying one law requires violating the other. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution is designed to avoid placing citizens in exactly this predicament:
This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof and all treaties made ... under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. (Article VI, Sec.2)
A government unable to protect its subjects from the sanctions of other or would-be governments is, to say the least, not a completely viable one.
Some social contract theorists try to resolve the problem by asserting that government is, in fact, a voluntary association. If true, this would simply make the belief that all involuntary associations are bad irrelevant in evaluating government. But there is no historical evidence of an "original" contract, and even if there were an original contract it could not--by the logic of contracts--bind later generations.
Other social contract theorists, following Rousseau, argue that government ought to be a voluntary association. But this does not justify existing governments, which are not voluntary associations. Rousseau's ideas were highly revolutionary, for no government could meet his test and still remain government. None of the four government functions discussed above could be performed by an organization that enters only into voluntary associations, that is to say by one which has no laws.
Another way out of the dilemma is to capitulate and say that governments being bad, none should exist. The anarchists take this position, sometimes in the strongest possible way: there should be no government, period, now or ever. Says Benjamin Tucker:
Protection they look upon as a thing to be secured, as long as it is necessary, by voluntary association and cooperation for self-defence, or as a commodity to be purchased, like any other commodity, of those who offer the best article at the lowest price. Footnote 2.
Classical Marxists also conclude that government--'the state"--is unjustifiable. But they believe that it is neither desirable nor possible to get rid of it immediately. Rather, there must be a revolution in which the tables are turned and the previously exploited workers (proletariat) grab control of the state away from the capitalists (bourgeoisie). During a transition period, the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the bourgeoisie is gradually "liquidated"--an ambiguous term which might mean anything from physical extermination of its members to their absorption into the ranks of the proletariat. Only when this process is finished is there no longer any need for the state, which can then "wither" away and disappear. The justification given by ruling Marxists for their government is therefore similar to defending a war on the grounds that it will end war: Their rule is said to be hastening the day when government will no longer be necessary. The more negative one's view of government, therefore, the more defensible is the government whose leaders claim they are seeking to destroy government.
Our analysis of associations suggests that governments are justifiable for reasons similar to whose used by ruling Marxists. Rather than denying that involuntary associations are always bad or that governments are involuntary associations, we need merely recognize that a world without any involuntary associations is impossible. And this fact is not just temporary, as the Marxists would have it, but permanent. One function of government is to minimize private-involuntary associations. Without government, these private- involuntary associations would proliferate. Even Tucker's proposed "voluntary association" for securing protection would have to impose sanctions in order to protect its clients. If the worst that could be done to a robber were to boycott him (withdrawn inducements) and denounce him (power of pen), the price of robbery would not be high enough to deter it. Tucker's proposed organization would therefore produce involuntary associations, violating the anarchists' own rule that there should be no such associations in a decent society.
Anarchists, of course, might reply that these involuntary associations--produced in protecting people from robbers--are not as bad as those that would otherwise be produced by the robbers. But this argument, which is true, lets the cat out of their philosophical bag. Once one admits that a society without any involuntary associations is impossible, and that all involuntary associations are not equally bad, then the premise that all involuntary associations are bad does not automatically lead to the conclusion that government is unjustifiable. Government may then be justified as a lesser evil than the private-involuntary associations that would otherwise multiply.
Government is justifiable only as a lesser evil! This conclusion may border on praising government with faint damnation, but we need not regard it as derogatory or unpatriotic. Lesser evils are rather standard political logic, for circumstances often exist where the best thing we can do is to do the least bad thing possible. When President Truman had to choose between ordering the use of the A- bomb or invading Japan to end World War II, neither alternative had many positive attractions. Both would cause large numbers of fatalities. Winston Churchill once that said "democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others that have been tried from time to time." Or as James Madison, speaking of the "auxiliary precautions" built into the U.S. Constitution, put it:
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary; to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature. If men were angels, no government would be necessary. (Federalist, Number 51.)
For more than 2000 years, philosophers have tried to find a satisfying positive justification for government. To the last man, they have failed. We can now see the reason for this failure: no such justification is even conceivable. But it also, in our imperfect world, is not necessary.
If all political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, this can only heighten our concerns about how that power is organized and employed. Government is a system for keeping the lid on problems posed by private-involuntary associations. Government-as- bandit can be seen as a problem of the solution. Government-as-bandit imposes sanctions on people in an unprincipled way, and all of the arguments against private-involuntary associations apply even more strongly when the bandit is government itself. There can be no assurance, ;when government can single out some people and impose sanctions on them, that the power will not be abused. Good government, therefore, requires elimination of government-as-bandit.
It follows that the only generally defensible involuntary associations are the public ones created by government-as-legislator. The classical formulation of this said that we should have "the rule of law." A more specific modern way of putting it is: Laws, si; pseudo- laws, no!
As we have seen in part II, above, the word law as commonly used expresses three wildly different meanings when observed from the perspective of the periodic table of human associations. But this word is hardly unique in its ambiguity, and we need to remember that many of the words used in politics and in the analysis of politics may; mean quite different things from time to time and from person to person. It is therefore useful to find techniques which can help us to sort out the different meanings expressed by a single word.
One such technique is to add different index numbers to a word when it is being used to mean different things. An index number is merely a small number placed just after and slightly lower than the word being indexed. For example, we could distinguish between door1 (pronounced "door sub one") and door2 (pronounced "door sub two"), if we noticed that sometimes the word door refers to an opening in a wall through which one can go, and other times it refers to the object used to block up that opening so that one can not go through!
Stereotyping is surely one of the most pernicious and troublesome temptations of human thought. Its danger is probably implicit in the very nature of language. Language appears to be rooted in classified experiences, different events or things lumped into the same "class" or category, which in turn is expressed by a word.
"Cow," for example, is a noun which refers to a large number of different individual animals which share certain characteristics in common. It is a useful term because it points to the existence of these general characteristics, but it is dangerous to the extent that differences between individual cows--Bessy and Bossie--are ignored even thought they may be important. (Bossie may be good-natured; Bessy may be inclined to kick or bite people; Bossie's milk may be contaminated, while Bessie's is pure and safe to drink.)
The semanticist S.I. Hayakawa suggested that it is good to remind ourselves periodically that "cow1 is not cow2," that merely knowing what cows have in common is not all we need to know, that individual differences can be all-important. He went on to note that keeping this fact in mind is even more important when dealing with words relating to types of people: Jew, black person, Communist, Republican, etc.
When we stereotype, we ignore individual differences and assume that knowing one thing about somebody tells us all we need to know: "When you've seen one Jew, you've seen them all." "All men are alike!" "Black people are lazy!" "You can always tell a Harvard man, but you can't tell him much!"
As Hayakawa notes, if a man assumes that all Jews are the same, and that all they care about is money, he may be so busy watching his wallet that he doesn't notice that this particular Jew is about to run away with his wife. Or he may lose the opportunity to make a wonderful friend. By adding index numbers to our thinking, we can remember that stereotypes and prejudice are based on the demonstrably false assumption that all individuals who share one characteristic also share another one.
Let us frequently, therefore, take time out to remind ourselves that:
(Just to keep ourselves on our toes, though, we might also want to ponder the implications of the following tee-shirt slogan: "When you've seen one atomic war, you've seen them all!" I believe, however, that this is not a case of stereotyping.)
An example of how the indexing technique can be applied to separate the different meanings of words can be seen in the following analysis of "segregation" and "integration," surely two of the most contentious terms in today's political vocabulary. Although clarifying the meaning of terms will not automatically bring conflicting political positions into harmony, clarifying what the various camps are fighting about may be an important step towards a mutually agreeable settlement.
The basic distinction I have found that is relevant to sorting out "segregation" and "integration" is that between a way of acting and a state of affairs or situation. Employing this distinction, we can generate the following table:
Segregation Integration
__________________________________________
| | |
state of | segregation1 | integration1 |
affairs | | |
| | |
| | |
|____________________|_____________________|
| | |
| | |
way of | segregation2 | integration2 |
acting | | |
| | |
| | |
| |_____________________|
| | |
| | |
| | integration3 |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
|____________________|_____________________|
Segregation1 is a state of affairs, a situation. It exists if in a place where the ratio of the races is 85% white to 15% black Footnote 3 but in some smaller institution (a school, factory, office, club, etc) in that place the percentages of blacks and whites are very different from those in the general population, say white 95%, black 5%. This kind of segregation is sometimes called de facto, in itself an acknowledgment that the word does not always mean the same thing. Sometimes it is called "racial imbalance."
Segregation2 is a way or basis of acting. It is racially discriminatory treatment for the purpose of keeping the races separated. If a personnel officer or admissions director generally rejects black applicants with personal qualities such that they would be accepted if they were white, we have segregation2. This kind of segregation is sometimes called de jure.
Obviously, if segregation2, racially discriminatory treatment, is going on it will tend to produce the state of affairs that we call segregation1. But racial imbalance (segregation1) can exist even when there is no racially discriminatory treatment (segregation2) currently going on. It may reflect the fact that discriminatory treatment used to take place, or it may have entirely different reasons.
Turning to integration1, we find that like segregation1 it is a state of affairs. It is the opposite of segregation1. It is sometimes called racial balance. The ratio of the races in some smaller institution is roughly the same as it is in a larger general population.
Integration2 is a way of acting, but oddly enough it is not entirely the opposite of segregation1. Like segregation2, integration1 involves treating people on the basis of their race. Unlike segregation2, integration2 treats people on the basis of their race for the purpose of promoting racial togetherness. Its goal is to bring about integration1, racial balance, which is the opposite of the goal of segregation2. Words which appear to be connected with integration2 include "racial quotas," "bussing," and "affirmative action" in one of its possible senses. Footnote 4
An issue arises at this point as to means and ends and ultimate values. Is it segregation in its statistical sense, racial imbalance, segregation1, that is morally evil? Or is it segregation2, racially discriminatory treatment of individuals without regard for their individual merits that is the basic problem, with segregation1 being alarming only to the extent it indicates that racially discriminatory treatment is going on?
If segregation2, racially discriminatory treatment, is the basic evil here, then integration2 appears to be a perverse remedy, for it too entails treating people differently depending on their race.
This is where integration3, a third possible meaning of the term, comes in. It too is a way or basis for treating people, but unlike integration2 it does not treat anybody on the basis of race. Instead, integration3 is colorblind treatment. Integration3 is thus the opposite both of integration2 and of segregation2.
Even if we assume that a society in which everybody treats everybody else in a colorblind way would be ideal, however, it does not necessarily follow that integration2--racially discriminatory treatment for the purpose of promoting togetherness (integration1)--is an unacceptable strategy. It is possible that only the degree of personal contact between people of different races made possible by integration1, the goal of integration2, can bring about the attitudes necessary ultimately to have a colorblind society. But it is also possible that techniques such as quotas and bussing will cause resentments among whites and self-doubts among blacks to such an extent that progress towards colorblindness is slowed rather than accelerated. Perhaps the only thing we can be sure about is that there is room for legitimate disagreement here as to the best possible strategies for exterminating racism.
If we are going to think productively about politics, we need an adequate vocabulary. Given the rapid changes in today's political situation and central issues, it is unlikely that a static political vocabulary can be an adequate one. We must therefore be sensitive to opportunities to develop new vocabulary when that will help us to think more effectively.
Imagine a citizen of ancient Greece, contemporary of Plato or Aristotle, several hundred years B.C., before whom a modern multi-speed bicycle suddenly materialized out of a time-warp. This person lacks words such as chain, tire, derailleur, cable, brake, handlebar, axle, gear, pedal, you name it, and he also lacks the concepts or ideas to which these words now point. How well could this observer describe what he has seen to someone else? Lacking the above concepts, how well could he even perceive the bicycle himself?
The advantages and disadvantages of creating particular definitions can be evaluated using the various transformations of our standard model of rational decision and action, D ----> X + Y: the act of defining a word in a certain way in pursuit of goal x also produces side effects Y. (See Part I of this book.) There is one more issue, however, that needs to be considered, and this is whether the new definition should be attached to an existing word or to a new word coined expressly for this purpose.
No general answer can be given to this question, because either approach has both advantages and disadvantages, and the ratio between them in a particular case will depend on the circumstances. Much will depend on whether any existing words are close enough, in their common meaning, to the new definition to make them plausible points to it, on the one hand, and on how good a new word can be knocked together from meaningful roots, on the other hand.
We have seen examples of both approaches to new definitions in this short book. The word laws--defined herein as general rules of action enforceable by sanctions--is an old word with a new, precise meaning. The word coopetition--defined as conflict over how to divide up the benefits produced by cooperation--is a new word invented specially to use with the new definition.
The history of the term pseudolaws, incidentally, is an interesting example of the gyrations one may go through before settling down on the best word for expressing a given meaning. Originally, I had no special word for this meaning. I used the word law to refer to the meaning now expressed by pseudolaw, but held my nose with my fingers (as if there was a bad stink!) when I used the word law in this sense. This not only made clear the fact that I meant something other than law in its sense as a general rule of action, but it also expressed the disgust which Is feel is appropriate when we encounter such things.
When I began to write down my thoughts, I originally put the world law in quotation marks--"law"--to indicate that they were only so-called laws. During the pre-publication editing of my previous book, Thinking About Politics: American Government in Associational Perspective, however, the publisher suggested that my distinction might escape the reader if I only used the quotation marks for this purpose. Instead, she proposed that I use the term quasi-laws.
It was clear that my editor was correct in her belief that something needed to be changed. But unfortunately there were two problems with the proposed term: First, quasi did not have the needed negative connotation, the feeling that disgust is called for. Second, there was a danger of confusion with the concept of quasi-legislative powers as this expression is used to describe the work of administrative agencies. I did not want to confuse the origin of the rules with their nature.
However the editor's suggestion was helpful in that I immediately saw the possibility that her recommended prefix quasi could be replaced by the alternative prefix pseudo, thereby simultaneously solving both problems. There is no danger of confusing pseudolaws with the quasi-legislative powers of regulatory agencies. And pseudo has an eminently satisfactory negative connotation. (Just try calling someone a pseudo-intellectual, pseudo-athlete, or pseudo-anything and you will see what I mean!) Thus I finally arrived at the word pseudolaw, which appears to be completely suitable to its intended purpose.
Political science, as noted in the Introduction to this book, is a science that tries to connect the "micro" level of individual lives and actions with the "macro" level of collective circumstances and consequences. The distinctive focal point of political science is government, and the distinctive thing about the organization we call government is that it can legitimately threaten sanctions against all individuals who violate its laws.
Although our original definition of an association assumed that individual people are the parties making it up, we then observed that once associations exist, they become parties which can then in turn enter into still further associations. But given our definition of an association, thus generalized--the relationship existing when one party's satisfaction is being changed by the actions of another party--we must be careful to note that we are now using terms like "action" metaphorically rather than literally.
Indeed, if we talk about "actions" by organizations and other associations, we are implicitly using a lot of other words metaphorically too. Does an organization literally have goals, or does it just "act" (sometimes) as if it had goals? Does it have "satisfaction" (defined as a ratio, remember, between perceived attainments and desires) or do we infer existence of an organizational equivalent to satisfaction from its "actions"?
We should be very careful not to take metaphorical language of this type too literally. Up to a point, the analogies expressed by metaphors can be useful, but beyond that point they can be extremely misleading. We should always remember that literally, organizations cannot act--only individuals can act, including acting on behalf of an organization. We must not confuse the organization-- which is made up of many individuals--with an individual, we must not confuse the macro with the micro.
As an example of the dangers of taking political metaphors literally, let us consider the concept of freedom applied not at the micro level but at the macro. We all know how important freedom is for us as individual human beings. Therefore, we generalize, freedom is good! But if freedom is good, then it seems to follow that all countries should be free, all nations should be free, all "peoples" (as it is sometimes put) should be free.
There is, however, at least one important difference between countries, nations, and "peoples," on the one hand, and individual people, on the other hand. These macro level entities are made up of large numbers of individual people, but it is usually far from obvious just which individuals "belong" to which countries, nations, or "peoples." And there are no adequate democratic or legal procedures for determining where one country, nation, or "people" leaves off and another begins when there is disagreement about this, which there always is! You can not resolve democratically the issue who will be included in just which electorate, which is precisely the issue in international boundary disputes. Thus there is always an issue as to just what are the macro-level entities that ought to be free, while no similar problem exists at the micro-level of individuals.
A second important difference is that individual claims to freedom are not unlimited. Rather, individual freedom is presumed to exist in the context of a government whose laws by definition are intended to limit the extent of that freedom in the interest of the general welfare. No similar limit on freedom is generally acknowledged when it comes to the claims of macro-level entities to freedom. Yet if law and order are necessary to a decent life at the local or national level, it would appear that they are equally necessary at the world level. Unthinking extrapolation of the value of freedom from its literal and limited application to individuals to a metaphorical and unlimited application to countries, nations, or "peoples" prevents us from seeing the need for the rule of law at the world level, the need for a world government.
Another way of stating this point is that there is a conflict between national freedom and maximizing individual freedom. With national freedom comes restrictions on individual freedom in the name of national defense: high taxes, military conscription, prohibition of travel to some countries. limits on immigration and emigration, obstacles to the flow of capital, goods, and ideas.
Let there be no doubt about it: individual liberty cannot be maximized in a world in which national freedom exists. Rather than uncritically hailing the virtues of national freedom, serious thinkers must therefore ask how much are we willing to pay for it?
A world government is not in the works in the very near future. Conducting foreign affairs with other independent governments will continue to be a regrettable necessity for some time. Things cannot be improved overnight. But this is no excuse for failing to ask ourselves where we want to be going, or how to go about getting there.
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1. Gordon Tullock, ,The Logic of the Law, N.Y.: Basic Books: 1971, p. 36.
2. Benjamin Tucker, State Socialism and Libertarianism," in Irving L. Horowitz, ed., The Anarchists, N.Y.: Dell, 1964, p. 181.
3. We are assuming here an extremely simplified situation, which will rarely or ever actually be the case, in which all people are either black or white.
4. In its other sense, which appears to have been the original intention of Congress in enacting legislation requiring it, "affirmative action" meant special actions to bring job and other opportunities to the attention of minorities so more would put themselves forward to be considered as applicants, but it did not require or perhaps even contemplate preferential treatment of particular individuals on racial grounds.