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Let us consider the possibilities implicit in the following expression:
(Imagine that there is a large capital C surrounding the letter A in this expression. To simplify transmitting this book via the World Wide Web, it is not explicitly stated here.)
The elements of the expression are:
In plain English, the expression says: Action A, taken within circumstances C in pursuit of goal X, also causes side effects Y.
For example, when President Gerald Ford took the action of pardoning Richard Nixon, during the post-Watergate witch hunt, to try to get public attention back on serious issues, a side effect of his action was to decrease his own chances for winning in 1976. (There are, of course, other possible interpretations of Mr. Ford's reasons for the pardon.)
As the C in our expression indicates, all actions take place within specific circumstances. But initially we can ignore circumstances, since the situation at any one point in time is a given and therefore cannot be manipulated. A simplified version of our expression is therefore
leaving the circumstances within which action A is taken implicit.
Clearly there are exactly three elements which can be manipulated: the action A, the goal X, and the side effects Y. Postulate an actor whose goal X can be attained via action A, but who strongly dislikes the side effects of taking action A. What are her options?
The first possibility is to seek a different action, A1, which will also produce goal X but with different side effects Y1:
Perhaps the new side effects are less unsatisfactory to the actor. The cost-benefit ratio Y1/X of action A1 may be acceptable where that of the original proposal A was not.
For example, Andrew Jackson discovered that John McLean, his inherited Postmaster General, did not approve of the spoils system. Yet the Post Office was a principal location of patronage jobs in those days. One solution would be to fire McLean, but the political side effects would have been considerable. So Jackson instead appointed McLean to the Supreme Court!
The second possibility is to modify goal X to X1. The somewhat different goal may be achievable by actions which would not deliver the original goal, and at an acceptable price:
Compromise of course is a pervasive political phenomenon in its own right, and examples are not hard to find. Take Emperor Pedro II of Brazil, say, who wanted to get rid of slavery but could not figure out how to do so without committing political suicide since slaveholders were a social bulwark of the monarch. Instead of forthrightly abolishing slavery, he therefore took steps to destroy it bit by bit, buying up and freeing some slaves, banning future importation, and making children born to slaves free at birth. (But in 1889 Pedro II went to Europe for medical treatment. His daughter, Princess Isabel, a militant abolitionist, took advantage of her regency to seek the unmodified goal: freedom now! Sure enough, the monarch was immediately overthrown.)
Another apparent possibility is to take the original action A, without unacceptable side effects Y, and also take some other action A3, one of the results of which is to cancel out the disliked parts of side effects Y:
For example, buy a desired Cadillac even though it wipes out your bank account, but then put your spouse to work to build it back up. But the combination of actions A and A3 can be regarded as two components of a single, compound action. Rather than a third possibility, therefore, this is just another example of the first (e.g.: find an action which produces the same goal but different side effects).
Still another possible manipulation allowed by expression A ----> X + Y is not just to modify the goal X but to abandon it completely. In a way this too is just a variation on a previously noted possibility: the ultimate possible modification of the goal, X0.
The third basic option is to stick to the original project: A ---> X + Y. If no alternative actions A1 can be found which will produce goal X with more acceptable side effects, and if goal X cannot be usefully modified, it does not necessarily follow that goal X must be abandoned. If the actor prefers X + Y to (not X) + (not Y) then she can hold her nose, make her "bargain with the devil," and take action A. Regret that such a price as Y must be paid to achieve X does not necessarily imply unwillingness to do so if necessary. (As King Henry IV put it, "Paris is worth a mass.")
One final possible manipulation of the basic expression requires explicit consideration of the circumstances C within which action A takes place (remember to visualize the implicit capital C around the letter A here):
Achievement of goal X always lies in the future, compared to the time of action A, though it need not be very far into that future. Although action must always take place within present circumstances, one possible goal that one can pursue via present actions is to secure improvements in future circumstances. C1 is a possible X:
Circumstances are important for two reasons. First, they make some conceivable actions possible and others impossible. Second, they affect the specific consequences which those actions which are possible will produce. Action in the present aimed at improving the future circumstances within which one will be acting is therefore an investment in the profoundest and most general sense of the term.
Perhaps President Taft was investing when he promoted an aging, conservative southern Democrat, Edward Douglass White, to be Chief Justice in 1910, rather than appointing a younger person with views closer to his own. Taft ultimately wanted the job for himself, and this appointment created the possibility of an early future vacancy. If this was Taft's game, his investment paid off brilliantly!
Present actions can also change the future circumstances within which other people act, making some actions possible and others impossible for them. Indeed, as we will see in Part II of this book, a concept of social causation which is fully compatible with free will lies precisely in this: such causation consists of causing possibilities and impossibilities for others, within which they can freely choose, rather than causing their actions.
Our basic expression for the elements of action and decision is not merely manipulatable. It can also serve as a model or pattern for a series of transformations, each pertaining to a different major type of action. In the context of the transformations, the original expression also acquires a special meaning which is distinguishable from its role as a general model.
The six variations of the expression (again taking the circumstances of action as implicit) are:
Each of these six variations can be manipulated in exactly the same ways as the basic expressions, but we need not go into this here.
Since the examples given above, in discussing the basic expression, were all drawn from the realm of ad hoc or retail decision-making, no specific discussion of A ----> X + Y as one of the six variations of the general model is needed here.
Variation two, R ----> X + Y, refers to a "wholesale" decision, the act of making a rule. Rule-making is wholesale in the sense that one is not merely deciding how to act in a particular case, but rather in a whole set of possible cases. (The distinction between the logic of A ----> X + Y and R ----> X + Y is analogous to that made by some philosophers between "act utilitarianism" and "rule utilitarianism.")
When there is a rule R that has thus been arrived at, by evaluating the benefits and side effects that observing it is expected to produce, action A in a specific case is not determined by considering goals and side effects as it is in the case of ad hoc action. Instead, the specific action is deduced from, or at least limited by, the rule. (Note that the broken arrow in the following expressions stands for logical implication rather than the causation indicated by the "solid" arrow.)
As an example of the situation depicted by R - - -> A consider the double jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment. As interpreted by the courts, it is an absolute bar to retrying a person who has been tried and acquitted of a given charge. If, under such circumstances, the federal government attempts to retry the person on the same charge, the judge would be obliged by this rule to dismiss the indictment.
An example of the meaning of R - - -> C can be found in a judge who is fixing a sentence governed by rule R. His decision is not deduced from the rule, but is chosen on one ground or another from among the set of actions compatible with the rule. The legal punishment for a certain crime may be expressed as a set of upper limits--"not more than $10,000 fine and 5 years in jail"--to what a judge can do to the convicted person. Sometimes the rule will also provide a floor as well as a ceiling to the judge's alternatives.
The differences between the action A which results from an ad hoc decision, A ----> X + Y, and from a rule, R - - -> A, etc., are by no means minimal. For example, when a hijacking or kidnapping has occurred, the best action in the specific case may seem to be to capitulate to the terrorists' demands. Otherwise, lives may be lost. However the best rule for dealing with hijackers may be to refuse to deal, because dealing encourages more of the same bad type of actions, increasing insecurity and risk to life in general. Rule-making forces us to consider the broader picture and ramifications of our individual actions.
One further characteristic of arriving a specified actions via rules rather than from direct evaluation of their expected consequences is that the rules of rule-maker and rule-applier can be separated. The separation between the legislative and judicial powers in the U.S. Constitution reflects a decision that in government this separation of roles ought to be the case.
Variation three, O ----> X + Y, refers to the act of organizing things in a certain way.
By organizing in particular ways, we create important parts of the circumstances within which future actions of all types take place. We thereby influence these future decisions. The act of organizing is thus a superwholesale approach to decision and action.
Organizations can be seen as collections of offices or roles, and roles in turn can be seen as sets of rules regarding proper and improper actions by the occupants of these roles. In this sense, also, the act of organizing can be regarded as a wholesale or indirect approach to rule-making and, thus, a superwholesale or doubly indirect approach to deciding how to act in specific cases.
The American Constitutional Convention of 1787 was one of history's most dramatic examples of acting to organize. It is thought to have had profound on the subsequent course of events in America. Likewise, the decisions by Lenin and his associates regarding the pre-revolutionary organization of the Communist Party continued to have important consequences as the Soviet Union approached the end of the twentieth century, more than 70 years later. Actually, decisions about how to organize (and reorganize) are constantly going on at all levels of society, and in all kinds of contexts. While most such decisions are not as dramatic as the above examples, taken as a whole they are a very important part of the decisions and actions going on in the world.
The fourth variation, S ----> X + Y, refers to the very special "action" of speaking or communicating with fellow human beings. Communications are such a special type of action, if indeed they are "action" in the proper sense of the term, that they require their own version of the general expression.
The implications of analyzing the act of saying a particular thing in terms of goals and side effects are troubling. If we decide what to say by projecting the costs and benefits of alternative communications S, truth and candor can easily get lost in the shuffle in the interest of expediency. Indeed, it is possible to argue that we should act in this regard according to a rule that we should not decide in this way how to speak!
Ethical considerations being placed aside, however, there is no doubt that a great deal (hopefully not all!) of human communications can be well understood in terms of the expression S ----> X + Y and its possible manipulations. This is not least so in the realm of politics. Phenomena such as demagoguery, sycophancy, campaign oratory, and propaganda clearly lend themselves to analysis in these terms. So do censorship, jamming, and other methods of preventing communications.
The special importance of the act of communicating in human life is implicit in the history of the struggle for freedom of speech. Organizationally, this has been embodied in the free speech clause of the First Amendment. Probably the single most important change in the Soviet Union in this light has been the rise of glasnost since 1985.
Variation four, D ----> X + Y, refers to the act of defining a word in a certain way. We are talking here about what is sometimes known as a "stipulative" definition. It is not a claim that this is what the word means when it is used by people in general or even how it is used by any other particular people. That is to say it is not a descriptive definition, of the type to be found in dictionaries.
Rather, a "stipulative" definition is merely a statement of what the decision maker intends to mean when using the word in question. "When I use this word," he or she is warning us, "this is what I mean, no more, no less." Of course the person creating the definition may hope that if people find the definition useful it will catch on and pass into general usage.
Imagine that you, as a writer or speaker, have worked out a specific definition for which, it appears, there is presently no word in your language which has exactly this meaning. The concept specified by the definition is a useful one, but in order to use it conveniently you need a word with which to point to it. What are your options?
One option is to invent a new word to point to the definition, or get someone else to do so. For example, many years ago I came up with the following definition:
"Conflict over how to divide up the benefits produced by cooperation."
It was clear that this type of conflict is a fundamental characteristic of voluntary associations (a concept which will be explained in Part II of this book). It is especially visible and important in labor management relations. One of my students, Doug Chamberlin, kindly invented a new word to point to my definition: coopetition.
The other option is to borrow an already existing word whose general meaning is close to your new definition, and announce that when you use this word, this is what you mean. This is what I am doing in Part II of this book when I define laws as general rules of action enforceable by sanctions.
The point to be emphasized by including variation four, D ----> X + Y, however, is that the act of defining is one which is in pursuit of a goal, and that this kind of decision has side effects. Ones goal may be to clarify though, to help people make a distinction that is usually glossed over or ignored, or it may be the antithetical goals of confusing thought or of getting people to forget about a distinction that they are now inclined to make. Side effects are particularly important when one is defining sets of related words, since defining one of the related terms in a certain way may have side effects (and not necessarily helpful ones!) for all of the other terms in the system. Therefore alternate definitions may need to be considered, in order to achieve our goals without causing problems elsewhere in the system, goals may need to be modified or abandoned under some circumstances, etc.
Finally, the fifth variation, T----> X + Y, refers to the act of translating a thought from one language to another. Since literal "one to one" translations are often impossible, or produce meaningless gibberish, choices must be made, and as with all choices the usual elements of decision and action--goals, side effects, circumstances--all come into play.
The translator's goal may be to convey the meaning expressed by the words being translated as closely as possible. In this event he or she may have to decide which of several possible meanings of the words is the meaning for this purpose, and will also have to determine which alternative translations will best convey that meaning. These decisions are not, however, political decisions.
On the other hand the translator may be primarily interested in manipulating the behavior of people via the power of words. The authenticity of the translation then becomes of secondary importance at best, and the principal issue becomes: what words, labeled as the results of translation, will be most likely to encourage the people who read them to act in the ways desired by the translator?
The most obvious potential for this second kind of translation--translation with a hidden agenda--exists when the words being translated come from a document which people tend to regard as authoritative. Foonote 2 When the document being "translated"is in the same language as that it is translated into, we normally use the term interpret rather than translate, but here too there are abundant opportunities for a hidden agenda.Footnote 3
Misinterpretations and mistranslations of authoritative documents, documents which are widely revered or respected, may be seen as efforts to hijack authority. They are efforts to gain automatic or unthinking approval of new ideas by portraying them as old. The use of this technique, or course, does not prove that the new ideas thus packaged are necessarily untrue or bad.
There are two very important questions of "ought" that come up in thinking about politics:
Unfortunately, these questions are frequently confused with each other. It is very important that we recognize them as separate, even though they are often closely related.
What ought to be? refers to states of affairs, to arrangements, institutions, organizations. Which is the better way to arrange a legislature, unicameral or bicameral? Should there be an Eminent Domain clause in the Constitution? Is poverty bad? Should the U.S. be in the United Nations? These are all questions about what ought to be.
What ought to be done? refers to present or future actions. Should we try to send another man to the moon? Should we convict the defendant? For whom should I vote?
The difference between what ought to be and what ought to be done can be graphically illustrated by imagining that you have been shipwrecked on a small island. The island is one on which you can survive, but not much more than that. Not far away, however, is another island. Studying it with binoculars, you conclude that it would be a much better place to live. Therefore, you ought to be on the other island.
But what ought to be done? Consider the following possible facts: First, you cannot swim. Second, there is nothing on your present island with which to construct a boat. Third, the waters between the islands are teeming with sharks. Under these circumstances, it is quite reasonable to say both:
In terms of our analysis of decision and action, A ----> X + Y, the only immediate actions that could deliver the goal X (being on the other island) are either unavailable or are likely to produce unacceptable side effects Y. You would rather be on your present island and in good health than to drown or be devoured trying to get to the other one. And this is in spite of the fact that the other island is a much better place to be. Although the two questions appear to be very similar, deciding what ought to be does not tell us what ought to be done.
1. The idea for this variation came to me while listening to a lecture by my colleague, George Aichele, Professor of Philosophy/Religion at Adrian College.
2. The Bible is probably the most obvious target for translations based on a "hidden agenda." It is interesting to watch the current efforts to "desex" references to God in the Bible and in Bible-derived materials like hymns. But one need not assume that translations in this spirit necessarily have the effect of perverting the true meaning of an originally authentic document. In the case of the Bible, for example, it seems at least conceivable that the meanings added via deliberate mistranslation constitute a constantly improving approximation of the divine mind. Revelation can be gradual as well as sudden!
3. An authoritative document frequently subjected to hidden agenda translations is the U.S. Constitution.